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I. INTRODUCTION
Hoping to embark on a successful entrepreneurial venture, John
becomes Mike’s business partner wherein Mike invests in the purchase
of two trucks for John’s use in his new trucking service. John has trouble
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keeping up with his bills and eventually files a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
petition. John’s attorney immediately writes Mike identifying him as a
creditor and demanding that Mike make no attempts to collect upon the
obligation. One month later, Mike goes to John’s residence and threatens
to tow the trucks away. John, confused, contacts his attorney who sends
Mike a letter indicating that his acts violated the automatic stay and
demands that he stop such actions immediately. One month later, Mike
enters John’s residence, shuts off the lights, and holds a finger to John’s
head as if holding a gun and screams, “I’m not playing. Next time I’m
going to bring a gun and blow your brains out.” For several months John
suffers from anxiety, insomnia, and diagnosed depression as a direct
result of Mike’s death threat.1
While it is clear that John suffers from severe emotional distress
attributable to Mike’s death threat, whether John may recover for his
injuries under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (“Bankruptcy Code”)2
varies with where he files for bankruptcy.3 All federal courts rely on 11
U.S.C. § 362(h) to determine whether and under what circumstances a
debtor may recover emotional distress damages for a willful violation of
the automatic stay.4 All federal decisions interpreting § 362(h) have
decided that a debtor may recover emotional distress damages under the
Bankruptcy Code for a willful violation of the automatic stay.5 Federal
courts, however, are split on two main issues: (1) whether a related
financial loss is a predicate to awarding emotional distress damages,6 and
(2) the proof necessary for a debtor to establish a case for emotional
distress damages.7 Of the three federal appellate courts deciding these
1
The preceding hypothetical is based partially on the facts in Wagner v. Ivory (In re
Wagner), 74 B.R. 898 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
2
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
3
See Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 239 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that
emotional distress damages are not permitted under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) where there is no
related financial loss); But see Dawson v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 390 F.3d 1139 (9th
Cir. 2004) (holding that pecuniary loss is not required in order to claim emotional distress
damages under § 362(h)).
4
Section 362(h) of the Code provides a statutory cause of action for a creditor’s
willful violation of the automatic stay causing the debtor injury.
5
See Stinson v. Bi-Rite Rest. Supply, Inc. (In re Stinson), 295 B.R. 109 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2003) (holding that under appropriate circumstances emotional distress damages may
be recovered as “actual damages” under § 362(h)); In re Rosa, 313 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2004) (holding that emotional distress is an actual injury for which a debtor may
recover damages under § 362(h)); Bishop v. U.S. Bank (In re Bishop), 296 B.R. 890
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003) (explaining that “actual damages” for which recovery is
mandated under § 362(h) include those for emotional distress).
6
See supra note 3.
7
Compare Bishop, 296 B.R. at 895 (“An award of damages for emotional distress
due to a violation of the stay is appropriate where a natural and powerful emotional
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issues,8 only one actually specifies ways to establish a claim for
emotional distress.9 Surprisingly, although these issues have been widely
litigated within the circuits,10 they have received little scholarly
attention.11
This comment argues that: (1) financial loss should not be a
predicate to awarding emotional distress damages for violation of the
automatic stay, and (2) the federal appellate courts should establish clear
guidelines for the lower courts concerning what evidence is sufficient to
establish a claim for emotional distress damages. Part II of this comment
analyzes the history and purpose of the automatic stay provision
embodied in § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, focusing specifically on §
362(h), which addresses remedies for breach of the automatic stay. Part
III compares and contrasts the three federal courts of appeals decisions
that have addressed emotional distress damages for violation of the
automatic stay. Part IV concludes that a financial loss should not be a
predicate to awarding emotional distress damages for breach of the
automatic stay, and suggests specific standards by which the lower courts
may determine whether to award those damages in a given case.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1978, eight years after Congress created the Commission on
Bankruptcy Laws to suggest comprehensive reforms to the 1898
Bankruptcy Act (“Bankruptcy Act”), Congress passed the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 (“Bankruptcy Code” or “the Code”), replacing the

distress is readily apparent from the nature or extent of the wrongful conduct under the
particular circumstances surrounding the stay violation.”), with In re Perviz, 302 B.R.
357, 371 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003) (“Damages for mental/emotional distress may be
awarded if two conditions are met: (1) the debtor clearly suffered some appreciable
emotional/mental harm; and (2) the actions giving rise to the emotional/mental distress
were severe in nature.”).
8
See supra note 3; see also Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265 (1st
Cir. 1999).
9
Dawson v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 390 F.3d 1139, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2004).
10
See, e.g., Burke v. Georgia Dep’t of Rev. (In re Burke), 285 B.R. 534, 536-37
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2001); Patterson v. Chrysler Fin. Co. (In re Patterson), 263 B.R. 82, 97
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001); Diviney v. NationsBank of Tex. (In re Diviney), 211 B.R. 951,
961 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1997), aff’d, 225 B.R. 762 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998); Fisher v.
Blackstone Fin. Servs., Inc. (In re Fisher), 144 B.R. 237 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992).
11
See Thurmond & Fleming, Do Section 362(h) “Actual Damages” Include
Emotional Distress Damages?, Norton Bankruptcy Law Adviser No. 9 (Sept. 2004); see
also Ralph C. McCullough II, Emotional Distress Damages: Should They Be Permitted
Under the Bankruptcy Code for a Willful Violation of the Stay?, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM.
L.J. 339 (Spring 2003).
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Bankruptcy Act.12 The Bankruptcy Code was primarily enacted to
protect the good faith debtor while also providing for the fair treatment
of creditors.13 Since its inception in 1978, the Bankruptcy Code has been
substantially amended by Congress in 1984, 1986, 1990, and 1994.14
The automatic stay,15 an integral part of the bankruptcy process
introduced in 1978 providing broad protection for both debtors and
creditors,16 becomes effective immediately upon the filing of a
bankruptcy petition and prohibits most creditors from initiating or
continuing actions against the debtor, the debtor’s property, or property
of the estate.17 The stay’s purpose is to protect both the debtor’s and
creditors’ interests throughout the bankruptcy proceeding.18 The House
Report for the Bankruptcy Code explains that
the automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections
provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing
12
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
13
See CHARLES J. TABB ET AL., BANKRUPTCY LAW: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND
PRACTICE 153 (1st ed. 2003); see also THOMAS D. CRANDALL ET AL., THE LAW OF
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS ¶ 10.02[2]-[3] (rev. ed. 1991).
14
See The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 98-353; Pub. L. No. 99-554;
Pub. L. No. 101-311; Pub. L. No. 103-394; see also ROBERT L. JORDAN ET AL.,
BANKRUPTCY 20 (5th ed. 1999).
15
Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that almost all collection attempts
by creditors cease upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The stayed activities include:
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced
before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim
against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under
this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from
the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any
lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the
debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United
States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
16
See TABB ET AL., supra note 13.
17
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1978).
18
See TABB ET AL., supra note 13.
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spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all
harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to
attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be
relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into
bankruptcy.19

The House Report continues by underscoring the importance of
creditor protection by explaining that
the automatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without it,
certain creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies
against the debtor’s property. Those who acted first would obtain
payment of the claims in preference to20 and to the detriment of
other creditors. Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly
liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated
equally.21 A race of diligence by creditors for the debtor’s assets
prevents that.22

The automatic stay provision, in § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code,
was enacted in 1978, including § 362(a) through § 362(g).23 In 1984, the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 added to
the Code subsection (h) which permits “an individual injured by any
willful violation of a stay . . . [to] . . . recover actual damages, including
costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances . . . punitive
damages.”24 Prior to this amendment, debtors injured by a creditor’s
willful breach of the automatic stay had to resort to the bankruptcy
court’s civil contempt power under § 105(a) to redress their injury.25
Section 362(h)’s legislative history makes clear that it was meant to
supplement the previously existing remedies in the Bankruptcy Code.26

97.

19

H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296-

20

It should be noted that this is not strictly a preference as defined in 11 U.S.C. §

547.

21
Technically, under the Code, all creditors are not treated equally as illustrated
when there exists a priority creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 507.
22
See supra note 19.
23
11 U.S.C. § 362.
24
11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1984).
25
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) states:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title
providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed
to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any
determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders
or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.
26
See 130 CONG. REC. H1942 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Rodino)
(“[section 362(h)] is an additional right of individual debtors, and is not intended to
foreclose recovery under already existing remedies.”).
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However, if bankruptcy judges could enforce the automatic stay by
awarding the debtor damages for willful violations by creditors, what
then is § 362(h)’s purpose? When the two sections are compared, three
main differences are apparent: (1) the sections’ scope, (2) the nature of
the sections, and (3) the ability to award punitive damages.
The most apparent difference between § 362(h) and § 105(a) is in
scope. Section 105(a), a broad equitable provision, provides bankruptcy
courts with powers to grant relief necessary to effectuate the Code’s
provisions, including civil contempt.27 By contrast, § 362(h) is narrowly
tailored specifically to redress willful violations of the automatic stay
causing injury to the debtor.28 Additionally, a majority of circuits hold
that § 362(h) affords relief solely to individuals and not business entities
such as corporations.29 The broader § 105(a) civil contempt remedy is
unanimously held to apply to both individual and corporate debtors
during the bankruptcy proceeding.30 Also, § 362(h) is self-executing
whereas § 105(a) requires that the party asserting the cause of action
have standing under some other section of the Bankruptcy Code.31
Essentially, § 105(a) is a broad grant of power to effectuate the
Bankruptcy Code while § 362(h) is a narrow provision specifically
focusing on remedies for willful breach of the automatic stay.
The second important distinction between § 362(h) and § 105(a)
lies in their discretionary versus mandatory character. Civil contempt
orders under § 105(a) are discretionary in nature so bankruptcy courts are
27

See Miller v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Miller), 16 F.3d 240 (8th Cir. 1994).
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 362.11 (Matthew Bender 15th ed. rev.).
29
See Sosne v. Reinert & Duree, P.C. (In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., Inc.), 108
F.3d 881, 884 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that § 362(h) is not applicable to corporate
debtors); Cal. Employment Dev. Dep’t v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147,
1152 (9th Cir. 1996) (refusing to impose sanctions under § 362(h) because the trustee
was not an “individual”); Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng’g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539,
1551 (11th Cir. 1996) (arguing that § 362(h) does not include corporations); Mar.
Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 18687 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that § 362(h) is not applicable to corporate debtors). But see
Cuffee v. Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. (In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp.), 901 F.2d 325,
329 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that § 362(h) is applicable to corporations and partnerships);
Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir. 1986)
(upholding compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys fees for a violation
of the stay relating to corporate debtors). For a more detailed analysis see WILLIAM L.
NORTON, JR., Violation of Stay 362(h), in NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 2d §
36:42 (1997); Peter H. Carroll, III, Statutory Construction by the Ninth Circuit in Recent
Bankruptcy Cases, 22 CAL. BANKR. J. 262, 267-68 (1995).
30
See, e.g., Mountain Am. Credit Union v. Skinner (In re Skinner), 917 F.2d 444,
447 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that creditors that violate the stay of a corporate debtor are
punishable under the bankruptcy court’s civil contempt power).
31
See, e.g., In re Ozark Rest. Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 848 (1987).
28
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not required to award relief through contempt, even when a debtor
qualifies for damages.32 By contrast, § 362(h) damages, with the
exception of punitive damages, are mandatory where a creditor willfully
violates the automatic stay.33 Section 362(h) ensures that all debtors
injured as a result of a creditor’s willful violation of the stay receive at
least actual damages and attorney’s fees.34 The mandatory nature of the
award under § 362(h) increases certainty within the federal circuits and
relieves the appellate courts of the difficult burden of reviewing an
equitable civil contempt judgment.35
The final difference between § 362(h) and § 105(a) is availability of
punitive damages. Section 362(h) expressly permits an award for
punitive damages, however, such damages are not mandatory.36 Section
105(a) contains no express language permitting such an award and most
bankruptcy judges are reluctant to award punitive damages under the
court’s equitable powers.37 Section 362(h)’s express inclusion of punitive
damages reveals a legislative desire to not only compensate debtors for
their injuries, but also to punish creditors for willful conduct when
justified.38 Unfortunately, confusion still exists among the circuits as to
what conduct is necessary to justify an award of punitive damages for a
creditor’s willful violation of a stay.39
Distinguishing § 362(h) from § 105(a), however, still does not
resolve the section’s ambiguities. Without an express statement in §
362(h) of a specific legislative intent, judges have had difficulty
32

1987).

Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 613, 620 (9th Cir.

33
Budget Serv. Co., 804 F.2d at 292 (observing that it is mandatory for courts to
award compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees for a violation of a stay under §
362(h)).
34
Id.
35
See, e.g., In re Berryhill, 127 B.R. 427, 429 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991); Lakefield
Tel. Co. v. N. Telecomm., Inc., 696 F. Supp. 413, 423 (E.D. Wis. 1988); Rototron Corp.
v. Lake Shore Burial Vault Co., 553 F. Supp. 691, 699-700 (E.D. Wis. 1982), aff’d, 712
F.2d 1214 (7th Cir. 1983).
36
“An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section
shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate
circumstances, may recover punitive damages.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1984) (emphasis
added).
37
11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
38
See, e.g., In re Sumpter, 171 B.R. 835, 845 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994).
39
Compare In re Briggs, 143 B.R. 438 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992) (holding that
punitive damages are warranted under § 362(h) if the stay violation involves egregious,
intentional misconduct on the violators part.”), with In re B. Cohen & Sons Caterers, Inc.,
108 B.R. 482, 487-88 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (“The following factors are relevant in determining
whether to award punitive damages and the amount of such damages: (1) the nature of
the defendant’s conduct; (2) the defendant’s ability to pay; (3) the motives of the
defendant; and (4) any provocation by the debtor.”).
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interpreting under what circumstances the section authorizes an award
for emotional distress damages.40 Section 362(h) expressly includes
“actual damages” which usually includes compensatory damages
whether in a contract41 or tort setting.42 Permitting emotional distress
damages under § 362(h), requires deeming them actual damages43 as
only actual damages and punitive damages are expressly allowed under
the statute, and it is clear that emotional distress damages cannot be
considered punitive damages.44 Since the legislative history of § 362(h)
does not provide a definitive resolution to the issue of whether emotional
distress damages are authorized under the section, the issue has largely
been left to judicial interpretation.
III. FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS DECISIONS
Since enactment in 1984, § 362(h) has generated a significant
amount of litigation focusing on whether emotional distress damages are
permissible and, if so, under what circumstances.45 In the last twenty-one
years, only three federal appellate courts have rendered opinions on the
issue, the most recent in December of 2004.46 The opinions are divided:
(1) one view holds that there must be a financial injury to recover
emotional distress damages, and (2) an opposing view holds that a
financial injury is not necessary to recover for emotional distress.47 The
issue’s difficulty is exemplified by the most recent decision in which the

40

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Generally, actual damages in contract law include expectancy damages, reliance
damages, or restitutionary damages depending on the case’s facts. See CHARLES L. KNAPP
ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 960, 1051 (4th ed. 1999). Additionally, most cases
permit consequential and incidental damages as part of the underlying “compensatory”
award. Id. Awards for infliction of severe emotional distress do not lie in contract claims.
Id. at 1051.
42
Generally, actual damages in tort law include general compensatory damages
(including emotional distress damages) and special compensatory damages. See 1-3
DAMAGES IN TORT ACTION § 3.01 (Matthew Bender 2004). Additionally, in some
circumstances punitive damages are awarded for egregious conduct. Id.
43
Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 239 F.3d 876, 878 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[Kaneb] ... held
that damages awarded for emotional injury caused by a willful violation of the automatic
stay are ‘actual damages’. No doubt they are; but whether their award is authorized by the
statute is a separate question.”).
44
See ELAINE W. SHOBEN ET AL., REMEDIES 704 (3d ed. 2002) (“Unlike
compensatory damages, punitive damages are not awarded to plaintiffs to compensate for
their losses. Rather, punitive damages are awarded to punish defendants for egregious
conduct and deter defendants and others from future offenses.”).
45
See supra note 10.
46
See supra note 8.
47
See supra note 7.
41
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Ninth Circuit withdrew its original opinion to write a new opinion with
the exact opposite holding.48
A. The First Circuit - Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Kaneb
In 1993, Kenneth Kaneb (“Kaneb”), an eighty-five-year-old retiree
and widower, filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy.49 Every year Kaneb spent
the summer months at his Massachusetts residence and the winter
months at his Florida residence.50 Kaneb sold his Massachusetts
residence to pay secured creditors and later converted to a Chapter 7
liquidation.51 Shawmut Bank, N.A., held the first mortgage on Kaneb’s
second residence, a Florida condominium,52 and unsuccessfully sought
relief from the automatic stay to initiate foreclosure proceedings,
followed by unsuccessful settlement negotiations with Kaneb.53 Shortly
thereafter, Shawmut Bank merged with Fleet Bank (“Fleet”) and
subsequently forwarded Kaneb’s file to a Florida law firm (“Fleet’s
counsel”) to initiate foreclosure proceedings.54
The file forwarded to Fleet’s counsel contained an unsigned order
of discharge dated January 31, 1996, and an unsigned order granting
relief from the automatic stay.55 Fleet’s counsel believed that the
unsigned order granted Fleet relief from the bankruptcy stay and filed a
foreclosure complaint in state court on June 4, 1996.56 Shortly after
beginning the foreclosure, Kaneb’s attorney informed Fleet’s counsel of
the automatic stay and Fleet’s counsel in response placed Kaneb’s file on
hold status.57 Six weeks later Kaneb personally wrote a letter objecting to
the foreclosure which ultimately prompted Fleet to dismiss the
foreclosure.58 During those six weeks, however, a foreclosure notice was
published in the local newspaper, colorful fliers offering legal and
investment services bombarded Kaneb’s mailbox, and Kaneb’s neighbors

48

Compare Dawson v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 367 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2004),
withdrawn by Dawson v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 385 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 2004), with
Dawson v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 390 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2004).
49
Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265, 266 (1st Circuit 1999).
50
Id.
51
Id. at 267.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. The court, in footnote 4, identifies that this belief was erroneous because the
unsigned order did not give Fleet the requested relief from the stay. Id. at 267 n.4.
57
Kaneb, 196 F.3d at 267.
58
Id.
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began to avoid him.59 This proved disastrous to Kaneb who lived in an
affluent, gated community, and, prior to the foreclosure, his life had
revolved around social and recreational activities in the condominium.60
Kaneb commenced an action in the Massachusetts Bankruptcy
Court demanding actual and punitive damages under § 362(h) for Fleet’s
willful violation of the automatic stay.61 Finding a willful violation of the
automatic stay, the bankruptcy court awarded Kaneb $25,000 in
emotional distress damages and attorney’s fees.62 On appeal, the First
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court’s
decision.63 Fleet appealed to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
arguing insufficient evidence for the emotional distress award and that a
plaintiff must also suffer physical harm to receive emotional distress
damages.64
The court began by noting that since Fleet did not raise its concern
that physical harm must also occur to receive emotional distress
damages, it was therefore barred from asserting it on appeal.65 Next, the
court addressed Fleet’s challenge to the sufficiency of evidence for the
emotional distress claim. The court first noted that “emotional damages
qualify as ‘actual damages’ under § 362(h),” citing two bankruptcy court
decisions from the Second and Sixth Circuits.66 It concluded that Kaneb
provided specific information showing a decline in social invitations and
testified as to the resulting emotional distress, consisting of his having
trouble sleeping, his changed eating habits, and lack of ambition to go
out and meet new people.67 The court concluded that actual damages
under § 362(h), “must include the psychological suffering of this eightyfive-year-old retired widower,” and affirmed the bankruptcy appellate
panel’s decision sustaining the award.68

59
Id. Kaneb’s neighbors found out about the foreclosure actions through those
residents who held Kaneb’s mail while he was not living at his Florida residence;
additionally one neighbor received a solicitation addressed to Kaneb by mistake. Id.
60
Id.
61
Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265, 267 (1st Cir. 1999).
62
Id. at 269.
63
Id. at 267.
64
Id. Fleet also argued that there was no willful violation of the automatic stay
despite its pretrial stipulation to the contrary, but the court declined to address this
because Fleet had not presented the issue in the lower court proceedings. Id.
65
Id. at 269. The court concurred with the BAP majority in so holding.
66
Id. (citing Holden v. IRS (In re Holden), 226 B.R. 809 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998); In re
Carrigan, 109 B.R. 167 (Bankr. W.D. N.C. 1989)).
67
Id. at 270.
68
Id.

2005]

NO FINANCIAL INJURY NO PROBLEM

179

B. The Seventh Circuit - Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp.
Laura Aiello (“Aiello”) filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, listing
Providian Financial Corp. (“Providian”) as a creditor for a $1,000 credit
card debt.69 During the bankruptcy proceeding Providian demanded that
Aiello reaffirm her debt or be subject to fraud charges.70 Aiello refused to
reaffirm the debt and, instead, commenced a class action lawsuit in the
bankruptcy court against Providian for its harassment, which she asserted
constituted a willful violation of the automatic stay.71 The bankruptcy
court granted Providian summary judgment, reasoning that, “Aiello
could not obtain an award of damages under § 362(h) when her only
evidence of injury was the statement in her affidavit that upon receipt of
the threatening letter from the defendant she ‘cried, felt nauseous and
scared and the letter caused her to quarrel with her husband.’”72 The
district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision, and Providian
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.73
Judge Posner began the court’s opinion stating that the automatic
stay is primarily financial in character, and not meant to protect the
debtor’s peace of mind.74 Bankruptcy judges are not selected based on
their ability to evaluate emotional distress claims, and that victims of
emotional distress could resort to state tort law remedies to redress their
injuries.75 Judge Posner intimated that a debtor might be able to piggy
back a claim for emotional distress damages under the clean-up doctrine
where the debtor also suffers a financial injury.76 Under this doctrine, the
court may redress any financial injury caused by the willful violation of
the automatic stay and include an award for emotional distress under the
rubric of incidental damages, in the interest of judicial economy.77
Applying this rule, the court held that Aiello could not recover emotional
distress damages under § 362(h) because she did not have a financial
injury with which to attach the claim.78
Although Judge Posner could have ended the opinion at this point,
he continued to discuss the evolution of emotional distress damages in
69

Aiello, 239 F.3d at 878.
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. No evidence was offered as to the incidence of quarrels with her spouse before
the letter’s receipt.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 879.
75
Id. at 879-80.
76
Id. at 880. See DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGESEQUITY-RESTITUTION § 2.7, 180-81 (2d ed. 1993).
77
Id. at 880. Judge Posner demonstrated how this would relieve the debtor from
having to bring two separate suits. Id.
78
Id.
70
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the American court system.79 Since the Bankruptcy Act was passed
“before the modern era of receptivity to claims of damages for purely
emotional distress . . . there is no indication that Congress intended to
change the fundamental character of remedies by enacting § 362(h).”80
The court then noted that Aiello filed a class action lawsuit where the
potential for abuse increases as claimants like Aiello can aggregate their
claims with other members of the class ultimately pressuring the creditor
into settling its claim.81 The court ended by reinforcing the idea that
Aiello could resort to traditional state law tort remedies for her emotional
injuries.82
C. The Ninth Circuit – Dawson v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A.
In 1987, George and Barbara Dawson (“the Dawsons”) bought a
home in Richmond, California, obtaining a loan from Washington
Mutual Bank, F.A. (“Washington Mutual”) secured by a first deed of
trust.83 The Dawsons fell into arrears in 1993, and by the end of the year
filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy.84 After having their plan confirmed in late
1993, the Dawsons again failed to make their required payments to
Washington Mutual.85 In July of 1994, Washington Mutual obtained an
adequate protection order from the court providing that the automatic
stay would terminate in August of 1994 if the Dawsons did not make
their required payments.86 The Dawsons failed to do so prompting
Washington Mutual to schedule a foreclosure sale for early in 1995. Just
before the date of the foreclosure sale the Dawsons tendered payment of
the minimum required balance and the sale was discontinued.87
In 1995, while the Dawsons made certain payments to Washington
Mutual, they did not pay the minimum amount due under the Chapter 13
plan.88 As a result, Washington Mutual recorded a notice of default, and
on January 16, 1996 recorded a notice of sale stating a sale date of
February 8, 1996.89 Two days before the scheduled sale, George Dawson

79

Id. at 880-81.
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1143. A deed of trust is the functional equivalent of a
mortgage in this context. Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. On May 18, 1993, the Dawsons filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and, in
October of the same year, the Chapter 13 plan was confirmed. Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
80
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filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.90 While the facts are disputed as to whether
or when Washington Mutual received notice of the Chapter 7 filing, the
bankruptcy court held that Washington Mutual knew of the proceeding
by February 20, 1996, at the latest.91 On February 27, 1996, Washington
Mutual commenced an unlawful detainer action against the Dawsons
and, on the same day, received notice of George Dawson’s Chapter 7
filing.92 Washington Mutual later dismissed the unlawful detainer action
and, on July 23 of that same year, George Dawson’s Chapter 7
bankruptcy case was closed.93 On June 2, 1998, the Dawsons filed for a
second Chapter 13 bankruptcy and initiated an adversary complaint for
emotional distress damages stemming from Washington Mutual’s
violation of the automatic stay during George Dawson’s prior Chapter 7
bankruptcy proceeding.94
The bankruptcy court found a willful violation of the automatic stay
between February 20 and March 14, 1996,95 but denied the Dawsons
claim for emotional distress damages finding: (1) that the violation was
not egregious, and (2) the Dawsons failed to present sufficient evidence
to establish an award for emotional distress damages.96 Ultimately, the
bankruptcy court awarded Washington Mutual attorney’s fees and costs
in the amount of $2,307.60.97 The district court affirmed all holdings
relevant to the damage claim but remanded on another issue.98 The
Dawsons appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.99
The court began by determining whether Congress intended the
term “actual damages” in § 362(h) to include damages for emotional
distress.100 The statute included no definition for the term actual
damages,101 however, the court noted the importance of Congress’s use
of the term “individual” to denote whom may recover actual damages.102
90

Id. at 1144.
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. The court reasoned that Washington Mutual knew about George Dawson’s
Chapter 7 filing on February 20, 1996, at the latest; however Washington Mutual did not
dismiss its unlawful detainer action until March 14, 1996. Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. The district court remanded the case as it found that it was possible that
Washington Mutual violated the automatic stay with its February 1996 foreclosure sale,
because the Dawsons may have had an equitable interest in the property at the time
(through the Jameson Agreement). Id.
99
Id. at 1145.
100
Id. at 1146.
101
Id.
102
Id.
91
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Since the term “individual” applies to humans and not artificial entities,
such as corporations, the court concluded that Congress expressed an
intent to redress harms unique to human beings, such as emotional
distress.103
Since the statute’s text did not fully resolve the ambiguity, the court
turned to the legislative history of § 362.104 Congress enacted the section
with two goals intended for debtors: (1) a purely financial one meant to
give the debtor time to get his finances in order and to reorganize his
debts to maximize debt satisfaction,105 and (2) a more human goal
intended to give the debtor a “breathing spell” from his creditors.106 The
court referred to specific comments from the House Report:
The stay is the first part of bankruptcy relief, for it gives the
debtor a respite from the forces that led him to bankruptcy.
Frequently, a consumer debtor is severely harassed by his
creditors when he falls behind in payments on loans. The
harassment takes the form of abusive phone calls at all hours,
including at work, threats of court action, attacks on the debtor’s
reputation, and so on. The automatic stay at the commencement
of the case takes the pressure off the debtor.107

The court concluded that Congress intended emotional distress
damages to be recoverable under the section.108
Having concluded that emotional distress damages are authorized
under § 362(h), the court next focused on formulating a proper standard
to apply to claims for emotional distress damages.109 The court rejected
the Seventh Circuit’s argument that a financial loss is necessary for a
debtor to recover emotional distress damages under the section.110 The
court then determined that a debtor could recover for emotional distress
only if he or she: (1) suffers significant harm,111 (2) clearly establishes
the significant harm, and (3) demonstrates a causal connection between
the significant harm and the violation of the automatic stay.112

103

Id.
Id. at 1146-47.
105
Id.
106
Id. (citing U.S. v. Dos Cabezas Corp., 995 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1993)).
107
Id. at 1147-48 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 125-26, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6086-87).
108
Id.
109
Id. at 1148-49.
110
Id. at 1149.
111
Id. The court identified that fleeting or trivial anxiety or distress does not suffice
for a claim of emotional distress under § 362(h). Id.
112
Id. The court notes that for the third prong (the causal connection) the harm must
be distinct from the anxiety and pressures inherent in the bankruptcy process. Id.
104
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After establishing the proper standard for emotional distress claims,
the court turned to how a debtor could clearly establish a significant
harm. The court identified four general ways a debtor could do so: (1)
through corroborating medical evidence,113 (2) through the testimony of
non-experts, such as family, as to the manifestations of the emotional
distress the debtor exhibited,114 (3) a creditor may exhibit egregious
conduct and the significant harm may be readily apparent,115 and (4) the
significant harm may be readily apparent even though there is no
accompanying egregious conduct by the creditor.116
Next, the court applied the standard to the Dawson’s claim, noting
that the bankruptcy court did not permit an award for emotional distress
damages, and that the court of appeals was reviewing that decision to
ensure that the finding was not clearly erroneous.117 The only evidence
presented on behalf of George Dawson’s claim for emotional distress
damages was a self-declaration of emotional distress.118 The court of
appeals agreed with the bankruptcy court’s holding that Washington
Mutual’s conduct was not egregious, but was instead brief and minor;
however, it disagreed with the holding that, because the creditor’s
misconduct was not egregious, corroborating evidence was required to
establish the emotional distress.119 Rather, the court held that
an individual can prove entitlement to emotional distress
damages even in the absence of corroborating evidence and even
113

Id. (citing In re Briggs, 143 B.R. at 463 (requiring specific and definite evidence to
establish an emotional distress claim arising from violation of the automatic stay); In re
Stinson, 295 B.R. at 120 (“The majority of the courts have denied damages for emotional
distress where there is no medical or other hard evidence to show something more than a
fleeting or inconsequential injury.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Diviney,
211 B.R. at 967 (holding that where emotional distress seemed trivial and no medical
evidence corroborated the claim, damages for emotional distress were not warranted)).
114
Id. at 1149-50 (citing Varela v. Ocasio (In re Ocasio), 272 B.R. 815, 821-22
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding that testimony from the debtor’s wife - that
he suffered from headaches, did not feel well for a week, and went to the doctor to have
his nerves checked - was sufficient to support emotional distress damages of $1,000
without medical testimony)).
115
Id. at 1150 (citing In re Wagner, 74 B.R. at 905 (awarding emotional distress
damages, based on the debtor’s testimony, when a creditor entered the debtor’s home at
night, doused the lights, and pretended to hold a gun to the debtor’s head)).
116
Id. (citing United States v. Flynn (In re Flynn), 185 B.R. 89, 93 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
1995) (affirming $5,000 award of emotional distress damages, with no mention of
corroborating testimony, because “it is clear that appellee suffered emotional harm” when
she was forced to cancel her son’s birthday party because her checking account had been
frozen, even though the stay violation was brief and not egregious)).
117
Id.
118
Id. While Barbara Dawson submitted a declaration detailing the emotional distress
she allegedly endured, she provided no information as to George’s emotional distress. Id.
119
Id. at 1150-51.
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in the absence of an egregious violation, if the individual in fact
suffered significant emotional harm and the circumstances
surrounding the violation make it obvious that a reasonable
person would suffer significant emotional harm.120

The case was remanded for reconsideration.121
IV. DISCUSSION
The three courts of appeals decisions illustrate the circuit split
concerning emotional distress damages under § 362(h). The
disagreements among the circuits are: (1) whether a financial injury
attributable to a violation of the automatic stay is necessary to recover
emotional distress damages, and (2) what the proper legal standard is for
an emotional distress claim.
A. No Financial Loss Should Be Necessary
Before an appropriate legal standard can be developed, the courts
must first determine whether a debtor claiming emotional distress must
also claim a related financial injury in order to qualify for emotional
distress damages. Aiello held that a debtor must first suffer a financial
loss attributable to the violation of the automatic stay before recovering
damages for related emotional distress,122 by contrast Dawson allowed
the debtor to recover emotional distress damages without a related
financial injury.123 There being only two conflicting rulings by the
circuits, no majority rule has emerged.
The most comprehensive way to analyze whether § 362(h) requires
a financial loss before a debtor can recover for emotional distress is a
tripartite approach: (1) scrutinize the statute’s actual text to determine if
there is a plain meaning, (2) review the legislative history to see if
Congress contemplated the issue when it enacted the section, and (3)
review bankruptcy court decisions to assist in adding flesh to the
statutory framework. Ultimately, the appropriate conclusion emerges that
requiring a financial loss is inconsistent with the text of the statute, the
legislative history of the section, and the weight of authority in the
bankruptcy courts.

120

Id.
Id. at 1151.
122
Aiello, 239 F.3d at 880.
123
Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1149. The only other court of appeals to decide the issue of
emotional distress damages for a violation of the automatic stay is the First Circuit, which
did not address the issue presented here, but rather only held that emotional distress
damages are considered “actual damages” under the section. Kaneb, 196 F.3d at 269.
121
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1. The Text of Section 362(h)
Section 362(h) is short and seemingly straight forward stating that,
“an individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this
section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees,
and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.”124
The text is devoid of any suggestion that financial injury is a prerequisite
to recovering emotional distress damages. The text does not say “an
individual injured financially,” rather it states, “an individual injured”
without further elaboration.125 A recent Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Court
decision illustrates that the conclusion in Aiello is improper as it “add[s]
‘actual damages’ to the requirements of a ‘willful violation’ and an
‘injury’, a requirement that . . . [is] extra-statutory and unauthorized.”126
Additionally, use of the term “actual damages” may evidence Congress’s
intent to give debtors substantial latitude in recovering damages for
willful violation of the stay.127 The text seems to suggest that so long as a
willful violation of the automatic stay causes an injury to the debtor, the
debtor may recover damages for such injury under § 362(h).
The Seventh Circuit in Aiello did not appropriately analyze the
section’s text, instead deferring to the Code as a whole for a solution.128
The Ninth Circuit in Dawson, however, did analyze the text and
appropriately determined that it weighed in favor of not including a
requirement of related financial loss.129 The Ninth Circuit honed in on
Congress’s use of “individual” to denote the type of debtor eligible to
recover.130 The court assumed Congress’s purpose in using the term
“individual” was to redress harms that were unique to humans, such as
emotional distress claims.131 While this assumption may be criticized, the
use of “individual” may be the largest textual clue as to what types of
harms Congress intended to redress under the section. It is not
dispositive, however, because the federal circuits are not unanimous in
124

11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1984).
Id. See In re Jackson, 309 B.R. 33, 37 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004) (“Regarding the
necessity of an ‘injury,’ the Court notes that an ‘injury’ is broadly defined as being ‘a
violation of another’s legal right, for which the law provides a remedy.’ BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 789 (7th ed. 1999). The automatic stay is a legal right afforded to debtors
that, in part, protects them from continued collection actions by their creditors . . . Thus,
the mere violation of the automatic stay constitutes an injury to the debtor inasmuch as
the creditor’s violation restricts the debtor’s breathing spell and subjects the debtor to
continued collection efforts, possibly including harassment and intimidation.”).
126
In re Jackson, 309 B.R. at 37-38.
127
In re Stinson, 295 B.R. at 121.
128
Aiello, 239 F.3d at 880-81.
129
Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1146.
130
Id.
131
Id.
125
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holding that a corporation is deemed not to be an individual under this
section of the Bankruptcy Code.132
Congress added to the court’s power the ability to award punitive
damages under § 362(h), not previously available under the court’s civil
contempt power,133 possibly reflecting a congressional desire to protect
the debtor’s financial and emotional prosperity by punishing creditors
who impinge on either through egregious violation of the stay. If
Congress only intended to protect the debtor’s financial interests, actual
damages under the section would adequately compensate the debtor for
his loss. Congress, however, added the remedy of punitive damages to
penalize a creditor’s egregious violation of the stay. Most egregious
violations of the stay are likely to have the ability to inflict emotional
distress on the debtor,134 and Congress may have added punitive damages
as an additional protection of the debtor’s emotional state. After reading
the statute as a whole, there is no definitive plain meaning as to whether
a financial loss is necessary to award emotional distress damages, but the
text tends to favor an interpretation not requiring a financial loss.
2. Legislative History of Section 362(h)
Scattered throughout the House Reports on the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 are specific references to the automatic stay and glimpses
into what Congress intended to rectify through application of the
automatic stay. The House Report begins by stating:
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor
protections provided by the Bankruptcy Laws. It gives the
debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all
collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions.
It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or
reorganizational plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial
pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.135
This exemplifies Congress’s intent to redress pressures on the
debtor that were both financial and emotional in nature, as the first
purpose the House Report identifies for the stay is to give the debtor a

132

See supra note 29. The Ninth Circuit is quick to make this assumption because
circuit precedent holds that the term “individual” refers only to individuals and not to
corporations. See, e.g., Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 613,
618-20 (9th Cir. 1993).
133
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
134
See Part IV.B.2 infra.
135
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 629697 (emphasis added).
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“breathing spell” from his creditors.136 This might mean a financial
breathing spell, but the next sentence qualifies it, saying that the stay
stops “all collection efforts” and “all harassment.”137 The House Report
would not have included “all harassment” if it intended to protect only
the debtor’s financial interest.
The House Report discusses the importance of the automatic stay
specifically in Chapter 7 liquidations recognizing that:
The stay is the first part of the bankruptcy relief, for it gives
the debtor a respite from the forces that led him to bankruptcy.
Frequently, a consumer debtor is severely harassed by his
creditors when he falls behind in payments on loans. The
harassment takes the form of abusive phone calls at all hours,
including at work, threats of court action, attacks on the
debtor’s reputation, and so on. The automatic stay at the
commencement of the case takes the pressure off of the
debtor. Once the debtor has commenced the case, all creditors’
rights against the debtor become rights against the estate.
Creditors must seek satisfaction of their claims from the
estate. The automatic stay recognizes this by preventing
creditors from pursuing the debtor.138
While this paragraph addresses Chapter 7 cases, its application to
other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code is evident. The stay gives the
debtor a respite from the forces that led to bankruptcy, which could refer
to the financial forces, the emotional forces, or both.139 The next two
sentences, however, detail how this respite means a respite from both the
financial and emotional pressures of creditors. Congress expressly
illustrates the types of harassment a typical debtor encounters, and how
the automatic stay was designed to prevent such harassment.140
At one point in the House Report, Congress expressly references
the section’s purpose of protecting both the debtor’s social and economic
problems.141 The House Report states:
The consumer who seeks the relief of a bankruptcy court is an
individual who is in desperate trouble. He lacks the resources
to meet his commitments and has no means at his disposal to
rectify this situation. The short term future that he faces can
136

Id.
Id.
138
H.R. REP. No. 95-595 at 125-26 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6086-87 (emphasis added).
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 173 (1977) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6134.
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literally destroy the basic integrity of his household. We
believe that this individual is entitled to a focused and
compassionate effort on the part of the legal system to
alleviate otherwise insurmountable social and economic
problems.142
Thus, Congress enacted § 362 to preserve the debtor’s estate, while
additionally assisting with the debtor’s “otherwise insurmountable social
problems.”143 This express purpose of alleviating the debtor’s social
problems, undeniably evident in this excerpt, weighs against an
interpretation that this section is only concerned with the debtor’s
finances.
The legislative history reveals a congressional intent to protect
debtors from both financial loss and unreasonable emotional distress.
Multiple passages from the House Report indicate a desire to protect the
debtor from creditor harassment and insurmountable social problems.144
At most points, where the debtor’s financial interest is raised, the
debtor’s social and emotional state is also contemplated. While the
automatic stay is meant primarily to protect financial interests, an evident
second purpose is to protect the debtor’s reasonable emotional
expectations. The legislative history points strongly to an interpretation
permitting an award for emotional distress without a related financial
injury.
3. Relevant Bankruptcy Court Decisions
Since § 362(h)’s enactment in 1984, the issue of emotional distress
damages has been extensively litigated in bankruptcy courts.145
Analyzing these decisions will reveal the general sentiment of
bankruptcy judges when it comes to awarding emotional distress
damages under this section. The analysis begins by looking to
bankruptcy opinions which have awarded emotional distress damages
and, then, contrasting those with others denying such damages.
Bankruptcy court cases awarding emotional distress damages can
be broken down into two categories: (1) those awarding damages without
a related financial injury; and (2) those awarding damages involving a
related financial injury. The latter category is not as helpful since all
courts hold that emotional distress damages are available where there is

142
143
144
145

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See supra notes 135 and 142.
See supra note 10.
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also a related financial injury.146 The cases in the former category
provide important insight into why a related financial loss is not
necessary. The following analysis focuses on these cases which illustrate
under what circumstances bankruptcy courts are willing to award
emotional distress damages without a related financial loss.
Bankruptcy courts have not hesitated to award emotional distress
damages to a debtor where a creditor refers its debt to collection agencies
post-petition, who then issue harassing letters and harassing telephone
calls to the debtor.147 Additionally, courts have awarded emotional
distress damages to a debtor where the creditor goes to the debtor’s home
and vituperatively demands the payment of an outstanding debt.148
Likewise, bankruptcy courts have awarded the debtor emotional distress
damages when a creditor sends repossession agents, post-petition, to the
debtor’s residence to collect upon an outstanding debt.149 All of these
scenarios share a common trait: there is no accompanying financial loss
associated with the willful violation of the stay. In some of these cases,
courts even ignored the actual injury suffered by the debtor, yet awarded
emotional distress damages anyway based on the egregiousness of the
creditor’s conduct.150 These examples illustrate how bankruptcy courts
focus more on the acts of the creditor and its effect on the debtor, as
opposed to whether a financial injury accompanied the emotional injury,
when determining the applicability of emotional distress claims.
The bankruptcy court cases denying emotional distress damages
can also be broken down into two categories: (1) denial because of lack
of evidence to support the claim; and (2) denial because of a lack of an
146

However, some cases which have permitted an emotional distress claim where
there was also a financial injury have expressly stated as dicta that a financial injury is
not required to recover such damages under § 362(h). See, e.g., In re Bishop, 296 B.R. at
897 (“emotional distress is an actual harm that qualifies for an award of actual damages
under § 362(h) without regard to the existence of other damages.”).
147
See, e.g., Faust v. Texaco Ref. and Mktg., Inc. (In re Faust), 270 B.R. 310, 317
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1998) (awarding debtor emotional distress damages even though the
debtor did not sustain any financial injury and only claimed that she was worried and
upset for a few days afterward); In re Jacobs, 100 B.R. 357, 360 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989)
(awarding debtor emotional distress damages for embarrassment and humiliation
stemming from the creditor’s obnoxious collection efforts although the debtor never
sustained any financial injury resulting from the violation).
148
In re Carrigan, 109 B.R. at 171-72 (holding that the creditor’s action would have
caused any debtor anxiety and, thus, awarded debtor emotional distress damages without
any related financial injury).
149
Mercer v. D.E.F., Inc. (In re Mercer), 48 B.R. 562, 565 (Bankr. Minn. 1985)
(awarding the debtor emotional distress damages for the humiliation, embarrassment,
anxiety and frustration she suffered in the incident even though there was no
accompanying financial injury (besides the cost of replacing the broken door)).
150
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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accompanying financial injury. The cases in the latter category would be
extremely beneficial in determining the underlying logic of the Seventh
Circuit’s proposition that a financial injury is required.151 Unfortunately,
only one bankruptcy court outside of the Seventh Circuit has held that a
financial injury is required before a debtor may receive emotional
distress damages, and its analysis is not extensive.152 Additionally, those
bankruptcy decisions in the Seventh Circuit denying emotional distress
claims for lack of accompanying financial injury merely defer to Aiello
as controlling authority in lieu of providing logical support for such a
holding.153 The plethora of cases in the former category exhibits the
dysfunctional nature of the circuits in their inability to decide a proper
standard for proving emotional distress claims. Those cases will be
analyzed in more detail in the following section discussing the
appropriate standards for determining a claim for emotional distress.154
A review of bankruptcy court decisions throughout the various
circuits reveals that bankruptcy judges favor an interpretation permitting
emotional distress damages for violation of the automatic stay without
accompanying financial injury. Cases denying emotional distress
damages have mainly done so due to a lack of evidence presented by the
debtor155 or because of a lack of uniform standards from which to
determine if a claim for emotional distress resides.156 Only one case
outside the Seventh Circuit has held that a financial injury is necessary to
recover under the section, and that case has now been superseded by the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Dawson.157
Considering the statute’s text which does not include the
requirement of a related financial injury, the legislative history which
expressly identifies the need to protect the debtor’s reasonable emotional
151

See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
In re Stinson, 295 B.R. at 119-20 (agreeing with Aiello because of the opportunity
for abuse, however, this opinion was rendered before Dawson and as such would no
longer be controlling law in the Ninth Circuit).
153
See, e.g., In re Harris, 310 B.R. 395, 400 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004) (“The damages
contemplated by § 362(h) are primarily those relating to ‘financial loss.’ [citing
Aiello].”); In re Welch, 296 B.R. 170, 172 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003) (“Moreover, the
Seventh Circuit does not permit recovery for purely emotional injuries under 11 U.S.C. §
362(h). [citing Aiello].”).
154
See infra Part IV.B.
155
See In re Briggs, 143 B.R. at 463 (holding that evidence is insufficient where the
only evidence submitted by the debtor consisted of the debtor’s own vague and
conclusory testimony on the issue); see also In re Diviney, 211 B.R. at 967-68 (denying
claim where debtor offered no evidence to prove any such damages); In re Putnam, 167
B.R. 737 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994) (holding that insufficient evidence existed for an award
for humiliation).
156
See supra note 7.
157
See supra note 152.
152
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expectations, and the overwhelming majority of bankruptcy court
opinions which hold that a financial injury is not a predicate to awarding
emotional distress damages, it seems evident that the proper conclusion
is to award emotional distress damages regardless of accompanying
financial injury. Additionally, practical considerations, such as judicial
economy, militate against requiring that the debtor suffer a financial
injury in order to recover in the bankruptcy court for his injury.158
B. The Proper Legal Standard
If a financial injury should not be a predicate to emotional distress
damages under § 362(h), what should the proper legal standard be for a
claim for emotional distress? Many bankruptcy and state courts have
struggled with devising a bright line rule for emotional distress cases.159
As the bankruptcy court in Aiello noted, emotional distress damages
under § 362(h), “have been determined on a case-by-case basis, with no
expressly articulated principle guiding the decisions.”160 To achieve
uniform treatment of all debtors, in all circuits, the federal courts of
appeals must adopt clear guidelines on how to establish a claim for
emotional distress.
Dawson recently made the first attempt at composing a clear
standard.161 While the overall standard is well drafted, the details of each
element still need to be revised. Dawson held that a debtor claiming
emotional distress damages must: (1) suffer significant harm, (2) clearly
establish the significant harm, and (3) demonstrate a causal connection
between that significant harm and the violation of the automatic stay.162
Upon initial review, this provides an umbrella framework satisfactory to
guide bankruptcy courts in deciding whether to award emotional distress
damages for willful violation of the stay. When each element is
examined more closely, however, it appears that the standard needs to be
modified to broaden some requirements while narrowing others.
1. Debtor Must Suffer Significant Harm
The court’s first requirement is succinct but ambiguous, stating that
a debtor must suffer significant harm to recover for emotional distress
158

See, e.g., Aiello, 239 F.3d at 880 (Judge Posner intimated that judicial economy
would encourage that the debtor be spared from having to bring a separate lawsuit, apart
from the bankruptcy proceeding, stemming from an incident which occurred during the
bankruptcy proceeding).
159
See supra note 10.
160
Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 257 B.R. 245, 249 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000).
161
Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1149-50.
162
Id. at 1149.
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damages under § 362(h).163 The court does not elaborate as to what
significant harm is, simply stating that, “fleeting or trivial anxiety or
distress does not count.”164 The court cites In re Skeen deciding that the
debtor was not entitled to emotional distress damages because she did
not suffer significant harm.165 The debtor was “torn-up, shaken, and
nervous the rest of the day as a result of the telephone calls, [however]
there was no evidence that she sought medical relief or that the anxiety
caused by [creditor’s] collection efforts rendered her incapable of going
about her daily routine.”166 If this holding were followed, debtors would
not be able to fulfill the Ninth Circuit’s first requirement unless they
sought medical relief or the distress rendered them incapable of going
about a daily routine. It does not seem appropriate for the standard to be
based on factors that do not directly relate to the debtor’s severity of
harm. For example, consider a debtor who suffers from insomnia due to a
creditor’s egregious violation of the automatic stay, but does not seek
medical treatment and continues to go to work. Is this debtor to be denied
recovery even upon proof of the damages and a causal connection?
A requirement that the harm inflicted must be “significant” is
important because it addresses concerns that awarding damages for
emotional distress opens the door to frivolous claims.167 It is a threshold
requirement, however, that should not take into consideration issues of
proof but should only address whether the severity of the injury alleged
is compensable if adequately proved. Unfortunately, most courts blend
the first and second requirements together which has resulted in poor
precedent as to what constitutes fleeting and inconsequential injury and
what constitutes a significant injury.168
The standard of “fleeting and inconsequential” should not depend
on whether the debtor is seeking medical treatment.169 This is not to say
that this should not be one factor a court may consider when determining
if the harm is substantial, however, it should not be the main or sole
factor in its analysis. Bankruptcy courts should focus on factors such as:
(1) whether there is a physical manifestation of the emotional distress,
(2) what effect the distress would have on a reasonable person’s daily
163
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life, (3) what effect the distress had on this particular debtor’s daily life,
(4) if the debtor sought medical treatment (either consulting with a
doctor or psychologist), or (5) displays of other objective manifestations
of harm.170 To ensure that the harm is significant, courts should require
that there be a physical manifestation of the emotional distress. Absent
physical manifestation of the emotional distress, the debtor must allege
that the emotional distress had a severe effect on his daily activities.
Such a standard will require judges to analyze the facts of
emotional distress claims on a case-by-case basis. While it is not a bright
line rule judges can apply across the board, it provides guidance for
courts which may increase consistency and efficiency. Additionally, it
will keep the first requirement’s analysis of alleging significant harm
distinct from the second requirement’s analysis of proving that harm.
This distinction is important because a court must first determine if the
debtor has a compensable claim before it may determine if the debtor can
adequately prove that claim.
2. Debtor Must Adequately Prove the Harm
The second, and most comprehensive, element the Ninth Circuit
establishes in Dawson is that the debtor must clearly establish the
significant harm alleged in the first element.171 This focuses on issues of
proof, and more specifically, what a debtor must do to convince the court
that a claim of emotional distress is true. Bankruptcy courts, as well as
all federal and state courts, have had difficulty establishing clear
guidelines for how to prove emotional distress damages.172 Emotional
distress damages, by their very nature, are difficult to prove since they
may not be observable to the naked eye. The intangible nature of an
emotional distress claim makes this second requirement so important, as
it is one of the final hurdles standing in the way of frivolous claims.
Dawson expanded upon the concept of clearly establishing the
debtor’s significant harm. The court addressed four general ways a
debtor could adequately prove his emotional distress damages: (1) by
offering corroborating medical evidence, (2) through testimony by nonexperts as to the debtor’s manifestations of mental anguish, (3) where
there is egregious conduct and the harm is readily apparent, or (4) where
there is no egregious conduct but the circumstances make it obvious that
a reasonable person would suffer significant emotional harm.173 This list,
however is not exclusive because the court expressly stated that “an
170
171
172
173

See, e.g., In re Jackson, 309 B.R. 33, 39 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004).
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individual may establish” a claim for emotional distress through one of
these alternatives.174
A proper analysis requires an examination of each alternative
addressed by the court. The first way for a debtor to prove emotional
distress damages is through corroborating medical evidence.175 This
obviously is the most reliable way to prove emotional distress damages
because it is difficult to ignore clear scientific evidence supporting some
sort of manifestation from the emotional distress. Many debtors lack
corroborating medical evidence either because no medical treatment was
sought by the debtor or because the injury did not lend itself to being
corroborated by medical evidence. This has presented a problem for
debtors because circuits which require corroborating medical evidence to
prove emotional distress damages preclude claims by debtors who either
do not have physical manifestations of their emotional distress or do not
consult with a doctor or psychologist about their injury.176 Overcoming
this hurdle will require bankruptcy courts to allow debtors alternative
ways in which to prove their injury.177
A debtor can prove emotional distress damages under Dawson
through testimony by non-experts as to the debtor’s manifestations of
mental anguish.178 Dawson made express references to both friends and
coworkers as non-experts who could testify that significant emotional
harm had occurred.179 This alternative, however, is not as reliable as
corroborating medical evidence and does not yet have clearly defined
parameters.
This alternative is fraught with the possibility of fraud as the “nonexperts” may also be interested parties. The case the court cited for
purposes of illustrating this alternative provides the perfect example of
the possibility for fraud. The First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
permitted emotional distress damages where:
The Debtor’s wife testified that the Debtor was ‘hysterical’ and had
a headache upon returning home from the incident with [the creditor].
Four or five days later, he still did not feel well and went to a doctor who
174
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recommended medication for his nerves. She was unable to remember
either the name of the doctor or the name of the pills that were
prescribed.180
This passage illustrates how this alternative does not provide proper
guidelines for ensuring that the debtor is truly suffering from severe
emotional distress. When the “non-expert” is also an interested party,
testimony alone with nothing more should not serve as the basis for
proving a claim for emotional distress. Courts are most concerned about
limiting frivolous claims for emotional distress.181 Permitting a single
“non-expert”, who may be an interested witness, to prove the debtor’s
emotional distress through testimony, bankruptcy courts open the
floodgates for allowing frivolous claims for emotional distress.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s second alternative for proving the debtor’s
emotional distress should not be followed.
This second alternative, however, may be modified to ensure
reliable results while also permitting debtors to prove their emotional
distress damages without medical corroboration. If multiple objective
“non-experts” can testify to the debtor’s manifestation of the emotional
distress, then this alternative should prove reliable. Multiple “nonexpert” testimonies will limit frivolous claims by ensuring that a single
interested party cannot establish the requisite proof for a claim of
emotional distress. More importantly, permitting a debtor to prove
emotional distress damages in this manner relieves the debtor from the
confining obligation to present medical corroboration of the injury.
The third way to prove emotional distress damages is when the
creditor’s egregious conduct makes it readily apparent that the debtor
suffered emotional distress.182 Although, at first glance, this seems to fall
short of a proper standard, ultimately it should provide reliable outcomes
for proving emotional distress damages. Egregious conduct, often
likened to outrageous conduct in the tort realm, is conduct that “goes
beyond all possible bounds of decency to be regarded as atrocious and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”183 Situations in which a
creditor engages in egregious conduct will likely result in emotional
distress to any debtor strictly by definition of what conduct is deemed to
be egregious. While this standard does not require any corroborating
evidence, there is no need for it if the conduct itself is expected to cause

180
181
182
183

In re Ocasio, 272 B.R. at 821.
See Aiello, 239 F.3d at 880-81; see also Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1149.
Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1150.
Strauss v. Cilek, 418 N.W.2d 378, 379 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987).

196

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 1:169

emotional distress to most individuals.184 Therefore, this alternative can
safely be adopted by future courts in determining if the debtor has proven
his emotional distress damages.
Bankruptcy courts must be cautious, however, not to provide in
actual damages what should be provided through punitive damages.185
Just because it is sufficient for the egregiousness of the act to provide the
basis for proving that the emotional distress existed, it should not also
skew the award given which should be based purely on the damages
sustained by the debtor.
Lastly, a debtor can prove emotional distress damages under
Dawson where there is no egregious creditor conduct, but the
circumstances make clear that a reasonable person would suffer
significant emotional harm.186 This permits courts to award emotional
distress damages absent egregious conduct, corroborating medical
evidence, or expert testimony. This type of provision instills fear in
judges, like Judge Posner, who feel that awarding emotional distress
damages opens the floodgates to frivolous claims.187 Relying only on the
debtor’s own testimony, the court has no tangible proof for an award of
emotional distress damages.188
The amorphous nature of this category becomes more evident when
reviewing the case relied upon to support the holding. That case is In re
Flynn, where the debtor was “forced to cancel her son’s birthday party,
embarrassed in a check-out line at the supermarket and justifiably
worried that her checks would bounce due to the freeze on her
account.”189 This emotional distress may not pass muster under the first
requirement discussed earlier,190 and it is not obvious that a reasonable
person would experience severe emotional distress under similar
184
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circumstances. Such an unimaginable standard is susceptible to
inconsistent application. Other bankruptcy courts have held that the
debtor’s testimony without more cannot serve as a rational basis for
awarding emotional distress damages.191 This provides sufficient
justification to reject this final alternative.
Ultimately, only two ways out of the four enunciated in Dawson
provide a satisfactory basis for a debtor to prove emotional distress
damages: (1) proof through corroborating medical evidence,192 and (2)
proof of the creditor’s egregious conduct making it readily apparent that
the debtor suffered emotional distress.193 Additionally, a modification of
the second alternative provided in Dawson should permit a debtor to
prove emotional distress damages through multiple objective “nonexpert” testimonies. While it may be restrictive to permit only three ways
to prove emotional distress damages, it is important to properly regulate
such claims due to the enhanced susceptibility to fraud.194 Without such a
narrow construction, it would be impossible to permit emotional distress
damages at all for fear of frivolous claims.
3. Debtor Must Demonstrate a Causal Connection
The final hurdle debtors must clear to establish a claim for
emotional distress damages is demonstrating a causal connection
between the significant harm inflicted and a violation of the automatic
stay.195 As Dawson noted, the statute itself requires that the debtor be
“injured by” the violation.196 This distinguishes those harms inherent in
the bankruptcy process from those resulting from a willful violation of
the automatic stay. Bankruptcy is a harrowing experience that would
cause any debtor stress and anxiety. Debtors should not be permitted to
collect damages from a creditor if suffering anxiety from the bankruptcy
process itself, as opposed to inappropriate creditor conduct.
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In re Brockington perfectly illustrates a debtor’s lack of proper
causation.197 During a Chapter 13 proceeding, a secured creditor in the
debtor’s automobile towed the car from the debtor’s residence.198 For
several weeks thereafter, debtor went to the hospital for treatment of a
pre-existing heart condition.199 Debtor claimed emotional distress
damages stemming from the creditor’s willful violation of the automatic
stay, asserting the cost of medical treatment as the proper measure of
damages.200 The court found no proof of a causal connection between the
repossession and any ensuing medical treatment for an aggravated heart
condition.201 Brockington illustrates how the causation requirement
prevents debtors from recovering damages from creditors absent proper
causation.
The causation requirement implies that a debtor must make
reasonable efforts to mitigate those damages where possible. A good
example is In re Jackson, where a creditor repeatedly placed
repossession notices in the debtor’s door and made harassing telephone
calls to the debtor.202 The court noted that, “[w]hile these actions were
undoubtedly annoying and embarrassing . . . [debtor] could have ended
the harassment early on by asking her attorney to speak with [the
creditor] about its continued collection efforts.”203 Had the debtor
informed her attorney as to the harassing phone calls and repossession
notices, the harassment would probably have ceased upon the attorney’s
advising the creditor that its actions violated the automatic stay. Debtors
are to be barred from recovering emotional distress damages when those
injuries could have easily been avoided.
Since a claim for emotional distress damages is inherently a tort
claim, causation is particularly important in ensuring that the tortfeasor is
actually the one culpable for the damage incurred by the debtor.204
Without a causation requirement, creditors violating the automatic stay
will be liable to the debtor for any cognizable harm which the debtor
experienced during the often lengthy bankruptcy proceeding. Bankruptcy
courts must be careful not to overlook this element of a claim of
emotional distress under § 362(h), which may readily occur because the
first two requirements provide the substantive basis for the debtor’s
claim.
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V. CONCLUSION
The automatic stay is one of the most fundamental protections
provided for debtors and creditors in the Bankruptcy Code. Congress’s
enactment of § 362(h) in 1984 was a large step toward providing more
comprehensive consumer protection under the Bankruptcy Code.
Encapsulated in that consumer protection is protection from harassment
or egregious conduct by creditors which willfully violates the automatic
stay. Although the Bankruptcy Code is primarily concerned with
preserving the debtor’s finances, it is also concerned with redressing the
debtor’s emotional injuries resulting from the violation of the stay.
A comprehensive look at § 362(h) reveals that the text of the
section, the legislative history of the section and a hefty majority of the
bankruptcy courts urge an interpretation permitting emotional distress
damages regardless of a financial loss. The text does not include an
express requirement of a financial loss by the debtor and the legislative
history makes several references to protecting the debtor’s social welfare
and protecting against unlawful creditor harassment. Additionally, only
one bankruptcy court outside of the Seventh Circuit has held that a
pecuniary loss is a requirement to redressing a debtor’s claim for
emotional distress. It is clear that the proper interpretation of § 362(h) is
to permit emotional distress damages regardless of whether the debtor
suffered an accompanying financial injury.
A debtor has three hurdles to clear before collecting an award for
emotional distress. First the debtor’s claim must be significant, which
should require the debtor to display some form of physical manifestation
of the distress. If the debtor’s distress does not physically manifest itself,
the burden should then shift to the debtor to prove that the distress had a
severe effect on his daily life. The debtor must next prove the significant
harm, which can be established through either corroborating medical
evidence, multiple objective “non-expert” testimonies, or if the creditor’s
egregious conduct makes it readily apparent that the debtor suffered
emotional distress. Finally, the debtor must prove a causal connection
between the injury claimed and the creditor’s willful violation of the
automatic stay.
The Ninth Circuit in Dawson laid a solid foundation from which
other federal courts of appeals can now expound upon. This comment
argues that certain of those requirements should be broadened, while
other requirements should be constricted. For bankruptcy courts to have
a clear directive as to when to permit such damages, other courts of
appeals must hear the issue and weigh in on the debate. Until then, or
until Congress speaks to the issue, the framework provided in Dawson
and variations thereof must be utilized to enhance uniformity within the
circuits.
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